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Abstract 
 
This article considers when an interference with Article 9 should be found. It argues 
that while some limits are necessary, it is sufficient that there is ‘intimate connection’ 
between a religiously motivated act and a belief, and there should be no requirement 
of religious obligation or impossibility. It demonstrates that the historic approach of 
the ECtHR has been to overly limit the circumstances in which an interference with 
rights can be claimed, particularly in employment. It argues that the approach 
developed in Eweida v United Kingdom demonstrates a deeper understanding of the 
importance of Article 9, giving it broader effect, but that this is likely to mean that the 
Court will be faced with hard decisions as to when religious claims can be protected.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Freedom of conscience and religion is probably unique in its potential to 
challenge almost every area of law. Since society contains a multitude of religious 
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and moral beliefs, many religious people will constantly be faced with practices with 
which they disagree and will in a myriad of ways be constrained from living an 
ideally religious life. Not all of this can constitute an interference with the right under 
Article 9 to manifest belief ‘in teaching, practice and observance’. However, the 
European Court of Human Rights’ (ECtHR) approach has historically been 
unnecessarily restrictive in considering whether an interference under Article 9(1) 
exists, thus shutting out cases at an early stage of reasoning and before justification is 
considered under Article 9(2). This approach has been narrowed even further by the 
British courts. 
 Article 9 has therefore been of limited use to claimants. The first full case to 
be heard on it by the Court was not until 1993 1  as earlier cases were ruled 
inadmissible by the Commission. However, the ECtHR’s approach is currently in a 
state of flux, as demonstrated by Eweida v United Kingdom2 and is moving to a 
broader approach that correctly moves the attention to the justification stage.  
This article focuses on Article 9(1) and the question of interference. It does 
not consider when interferences will be justified. The first part will consider various 
proposals for deciding ‘where rights begin’.3 It will then address specific questions 
arising from ECHR and English case law on the topic, considering in particular 
whether it should be possible to claim an interference where the conflict could be 
avoided by resigning from employment or taking other similar action. The third 
section will consider the change brought by Eweida and discuss some remaining 
issues that have not yet been resolved. 
 
2. Possible Tests 
 
What amounts to an infringement of Article 9 is perhaps only matched in 
difficulty by the question of what is an infringement of the right to respect for a 
private and family life under Article 8. Part of the problem is that religion can be 
 
 
1 In Kokkinakis v Greece (1994) 17 EHRR 397. 
2 This is four conjoined cases: Eweida v United Kingdom Application No. 48420/10; Chaplin 
v United Kingdom Application No. 59842/10; Ladele v United Kingdom Application No. 
51671/10; McFarlane v United Kingdom Application No. 36516/10, Merits, 15 January 2013. 
3 Lupu, ‘Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion’ 
(1989) 102 Harvard Law Review 933. 
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central to a way of life and relevant to every decision a person makes. However, quite 
clearly, there have to be some constraints to keep the right within manageable limits.  
 
A. Impossible to comply with religious beliefs? 
 
The narrowest test is that in order to find an interference a religiously 
compelled act must be legally forbidden.4 This appears to be the approach taken in 
Cha'are Shalom Ve Tsedek v France5 which held there was no interference with 
religious rights where compliance with religious beliefs was not impossible. The 
applicant organisation was one of Ultra-Orthodox Jews who required meat certified as 
‘glatt’ and not merely kosher. They were denied a licence to ritually slaughter animals 
on the grounds that there was a licensed slaughterer in the area, albeit one that only 
produced kosher meat. The ECtHR held there would be an interference ‘only if the 
illegality of performing ritual slaughter made it impossible for ultra-orthodox Jews to 
eat meat from animals slaughtered in accordance with the religious prescriptions they 
considered applicable.’6 Given that glatt meat could be imported from Belgium this 
standard was not met. Taken at face value, this sets an extremely high standard. An 
impossibility test would permit severe burdens on belief without requiring any 
justification at all for the policy to be given.  
It could be objected that if the case is unsuccessful it does not really matter 
whether it is rejected at the interference or justification stage. However, the 
importance of finding an interference is that it means justification for the infringement 
has to be given. If a claim is rejected at the interference stage it makes no difference 
how ill thought out the policy, how unimportant the interest it protects, or how badly 
tailored the solution, because the right is formally considered not to be affected. 
Indeed, since there is no consideration of whether the action complies with a 
legitimate aim, such action could be taken out of mere dislike.7 It also excludes any 
 
 
4 The possible tests are partly drawn from Greenawalt’s discussion of when a ‘substantial 
burden’ should be found under American law: Greenawalt, ‘Religion and the Constitution 
Vol. 1’ (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002). 
5 Application No. 27417/95, Admissibility, 27 June 2000. 
6 Ibid. at para 80. 
7 Although probably not for discriminatory reasons as this would raise separate issues under 
Article 14 ECHR. 
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attempts to find less intrusive measures that protect the rights and interests on both 
sides. 
Even in restrictions made for the best of motives, at minimum, the state should 
have the obligation to explain why a right has been burdened. Winners and losers are 
inevitably created in all litigation. However, the loser has a right for the winner’s 
claim to be ‘justified on some ground found satisfactory to an outside arbiter’8 and for 
the outside arbiter to justify, and not merely enforce, their decision on the loser. This 
is part of the ‘culture of justification’,9 a vital part of the human rights project that the 
ECHR protects. The culture of justification is not only beneficial for society in 
ensuring that decisions made by the state are justifiable. The process also benefits the 
individuals involved, even if they ultimately still lose their case.  Too strict a test of 
interference may result in greater anger following unfavourable decisions than would 
otherwise be felt. Stychin argues that: 
 
‘While proponents of freedom of religion may accept the need for 
balancing, they are more likely to advocate that it should be done openly 
as a majoritarian limitation on the exercise of the right, rather than 
constitutively in the definition of its scope.’10  
 
To be told that you have suffered an injury, and this is unfortunate, but, ‘alas, 
cannot be accommodated in practice, given other important such demands’11 is more 
likely to be acceptable to a claimant, than simply to be told that no recognisable harm 
has been suffered. Indeed Calhoun refers to this as ‘losing twice’: the claimant not 
only loses their case but loses the recognition that they had a valid claim to make.12 
 
 
8 Brown ‘Liberty: The New Equality’ (2002) 72 New York University Law Review 1491. 
9 Cohen Eliya and Porat, ‘Proportionality and the Culture of Justification’ (2011) 59 The 
American Journal of Comparative Law 463. 
10 Stychin, ‘Faith in the Future: Sexuality, Religion and the Public Sphere’ (2009) 29 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 729 (emphasis in original). 
11  Taylor, ‘Living with Difference’ in Allen and Regan (eds) Debating Democracy’s 
Discontent: Essays on American Politics, Law and Public Philosophy’ (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998) at 218. 
12 Calhoun, Losing Twice: Harms of Indifference in the Supreme Court (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2011). 
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Happily, the high standard in Cha'are Shalom Ve Tsedek does not represent 
the court’s usual thinking. It was an unusual case. As presented by the court, the claim 
was a purely practical matter over access to meat that met strict religious standards. 
Since Ultra-Orthodox Jews did not face significant difficulty in obtaining such meat, 
as an equally good alternative to slaughtering the animals themselves was open to 
them, there could be no interference. It is possible this would be acceptable reasoning 
in another case: if there is little problem in fulfilling a religious obligation, then it is 
difficult to see how a right has been interfered with.  
Nevertheless, of course, this did not mean that the test to decide interference 
should be described so restrictively and indeed even on the unusual facts, the Court 
fails to fully analyse the issues in question. The major problem is that it sees religion 
only as a purely individual concern rather than as potentially communal or 
institutional. At the heart of the case was a dispute between the applicant organisation 
and the Association Consistoriale Israélite de Paris (ACIP), a much larger 
organisation that controlled the sale of kosher meat and had a licence from the 
government to slaughter animals. Cha'are Shalom Ve Tsedek had split from this 
organisation because it considered its interpretation of dietary and other laws 
insufficiently strict. The two organisations had attempted to reach an agreement 
permitting Cha'are Shalom Ve Tsedek to slaughter animals under ACIP’s auspices, 
but this failed owing to financial disagreements. The real problem therefore was the 
French government’s favouritism of ACIP and its permitting it to maintain its 
monopoly when challenged by other Jewish organisations. The ECtHR failed to truly 
recognise this, even though it did find that the French government’s argument that it 
had to prevent the proliferation of slaughterhouses tenuous. Overall then, this was a 
highly unusual case which had little to do with individual religious belief, and cannot 
be taken as authority that compliance must not be impossible. 
Problems with the test can be seen if it is applied to a more usual pattern of 
facts. In the Canadian case of Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony,13 some 
Hutterites objected on religious grounds to photographs being taken of them because 
they considered that this violated the Second Commandment, prohibiting the creation 
of idols or ‘any likeness of what is in heaven above or on the earth beneath or in the 
 
 
13 [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567. 
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water under the earth’.14 The Canadian Supreme Court held that a new requirement15 
that all driving licences had photographs and the picture placed in Alberta’s facial 
recognition data bank, was an interference with the Hutterites’ beliefs, although this 
was justified. But, even though not having a driving licence would make their rural 
farming existence very difficult, this would not be sufficient under the impossibility 
test. The Hutterites could hire drivers, even though this would conflict with their 
religious beliefs in self-sufficiency. Thus they would have been forced either to break 
a religious principle or to change an important aspect of their way of life, without 
raising any rights issue at all. Of course, this is not to say that the Hutterites should 
necessarily have won: concerns about identification may be sufficient reason to 
enforce the policy, but it would be wrong to have cut off the case before the 
government was called on to prove this.   
 
B. Religious obligation or religious motivation? 
 
Even if an impossibility test is rejected, this leaves open the question of whether the 
issue must concern a mandatory religious rule. Suggestions that a religious obligation 
is required can be seen in a number of early Commission cases such as X v UK.16 This 
however was a weak case where the complaint was that a Buddhist prisoner was 
prohibited from publishing articles in a Buddhist magazine: a rather tenuous and 
remote interference. More problematic is X v Austria17 which held that there was no 
interference with the rights of members of the Unification Church who were 
prohibited from setting up a legal association for the Church, since this was not 
essential in order for them to practice their religion.  
A religious obligation test should not be required. Defining what is religiously 
motivated rather than religiously required is difficult.18 An obligation requirement 
creates an impulse to ‘dutify’ every aspect of religion. This may be quite artificial. 
Laycock puts this as follows:  
 
 
 
14 Exodus 20:4. 
15 Previously there had been an exception for those with religious objections. 
16 Application No.5442/72, Admissibility, 20 December 1974. 
17 Application No. 8652/79, Admissibility, 15 December 1981. 
18 Laycock, ‘The Remnants of Free Exercise’ (1990) Supreme Court Review 1.  
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It assumes that the exercise of religion consists only of obeying the 
rules… all the affirmative communal and spiritual aspects of religion are 
assumed away… for many believers the attempt to distinguish what is 
required from what grows organically out of the religious experience is an 
utterly alien question, perhaps nonsensical.19  
 
Take for example a woman who wishes to become a nun in the Catholic 
Church. To her it may seem that she has a religious calling and to be prevented from 
doing so by the state would be to violate a religious duty. However, it could not be 
said that there is a general obligation within Catholicism to become a nun, although 
interference with this decision affects the deepest aspects of a person’s religious 
identity. Similarly, some Muslim women would say it is an absolute religious 
obligation to wear a headscarf. Others would see it more as a matter for personal 
reflection and choice. It is also unclear why two women who saw the practice in 
different ways, even though they had both reached the same decision for religious 
reasons, should be treated starkly differently.  
It is probable that some religious practices are put in terms of duty because 
this is more likely to be accepted by a court.20 However, requiring a religious 
compulsion may simply involve the court in difficult religious questions. Proving 
whether or not an act is a religious obligation is likely to be difficult, particularly in 
non-hierarchical religions. Not all religions have definite rules or doctrines. 21 
However, they may still have practices which are clearly part of the religion, even 
where there is no textual or other authority to which an adherent can point. Religious 
beliefs are often personal and there is likely to be a broad range of beliefs within 
religions. A religious obligation test is likely to require expert testimony, and thus 
potentially turn the enquiry into a test of religious orthodoxy.  
Even if there were a clear distinction between compulsion and motivation, 
religious duties may be less important to a believer than religiously motivated conduct. 
For example, most Christian denominations do not think it is a religious requirement 
 
 
19 Ibid. at 24. 
20 Sullivan, The Impossibility of Religious Freedom (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2005).  
21  See e.g. O’Brien, ‘Chant Down Babylon: Freedom of Religion and the Rastafarian 
Challenge to Majoritarianism’ (2002) 18 Journal of Law and Religion 219. 
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to attend Bible study groups, but for some it may be an important part of their 
religious practice. It would be a nonsense to say that a law that made studying a 
sacred text with others a criminal offence did not interfere with freedom of religion. A 
state that sought to make such behaviour illegal could probably only be acting for 
illegitimate reasons or at least disproportionately. Excluding mundane, but legitimate, 
reasons such as regulations about noise or traffic, which would apply to any meeting, 
any government that forbade such groups would be likely to be acting either to 
prevent opposition to itself or from a policy of religious intolerance. Any test that 
permitted such state behaviour without inquiry simply does not protect a fundamental 
human right sufficiently. To conclude then, it should be sufficient for an act to be 
religiously motivated, although the fact that it is not mandatory may be relevant when 
considering justification. 
 
C. All religiously motivated practices? 
 
The ECtHR has consistently held that ‘Article 9 does not protect every act motivated 
or inspired by a religion or belief’22 and has drawn a distinction between practices 
merely motivated by belief and those which are a ‘manifestation’ of belief, where 
there is an intimate connection between the act and the belief. Although the term 
manifestation is perhaps unclear, the idea that some practices motivated by religious 
belief are too remote to be protected is irreproachable. Cases such as Rushton v 
Nebraska Public Power District23 should not give rise to a claim. Two employees of a 
nuclear power station refused drug testing, not because they were religiously opposed 
to it, but because the company’s drug policy statement stated that alcoholism was a 
disease that could be treated. Contrary to this, they believed that alcoholism was not a 
disease but a sin. They therefore did not wish to affirm the policy.  
Including such a case would place weighty burdens on employers and the state 
in assessing these claims. It may encourage frivolous or spurious claims, made not for 
reasons of protecting conscience but to make political points or simply to cause 
disruption. Although the importance of the practice would be assessed at the 
 
 
22 Arrowsmith v UK (1981) 3 EHRR 218 at 228. 
23 653 F.Supp. 1510 (D.Neb.1987). 
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balancing stage, and therefore cases involving indirect unimportant interferences 
would be unlikely to be ultimately successful, there is still benefit in excluding some 
cases via a threshold test. The employees were not asked to directly do something 
which was against their beliefs (either a religious obligation or a motivated by a 
religious precept). The link was much weaker. Even the symbolic element is remote: 
whether or not the employer considered alcoholism a sin had little to do with the 
safety reasons for requiring drug testing at a nuclear power station, and there was no 
reason why adhering to this policy would have led anyone to question their views on 
alcoholism.  
In C v UK24 the Commission held that there was no interference where a 
Quaker refused to pay tax to support military activities because of her pacifist beliefs, 
wanting to pay into a ‘peace fund’ which would not be used for military activities. 
That the law is of general application is not sufficient justification for excluding tax 
cases, since that is also likely to be the case for most laws which impose direct and 
severe burdens on religious beliefs. It is also not sufficient to argue that providing 
such a fund would lead to administrative chaos as it would inevitably lead to more 
demands. While this is an important consideration, it should be dealt with under 
justification not interference. The real justification is that the burden is too remote: C 
was asked to take no action which demonstrated her approval of or required any 
involvement in military activities: she simply had a general obligation to pay taxes, 
which would be used for a variety of purposes. 
Nevertheless, a fairly broad approach to the question of protected acts should 
be taken, which takes seriously the full range of religious practice. This has not 
always been the case. Buxton LJ in R(Williamson) v Secretary of State for Education 
and Employment, 25  held Article 9 was restricted to ‘worship, proselytism and 
possibly… to mandated religious “practice”’ and then only to practices which were a 
‘clear, uniform and agreed requirement of the religion in question’, 26 although his 
argument on this point was not accepted by the rest of the Court of Appeal and 
overruled by the House of Lords.27 He therefore considered that a claim from parents 
 
 
24 Application No. 10358/83, Admissibility, 15 December 1983. 
25 [2003] Q.B. 1300 (Court of Appeal). 
26 Ibid. at 1314. 
27  [2005] 2 A.C. 246 
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to permit teachers to perform corporal punishment in private Christian schools 
because of a religious belief that it was necessary in order to ensure children’s moral 
behaviour, based on Biblical edicts, had no protection under Article 9.  
Pichon and Sajous v France,28 a case about the refusal of pharmacists to 
provide contraception which will be discussed further below, also gives a very narrow 
definition of the kinds of activity protected holding that: 
 
The main sphere protected by Article 9 is that of personal convictions and 
religious beliefs, in other words what are sometimes referred to as matters 
of individual conscience. It also protects acts that are closely linked to 
these matters such as acts of worship or devotion forming part of the 
practice of a religion or a belief in a generally accepted form. 
 
Such a narrow protection of religious practice is not sufficient. It is a very 
cramped understanding of what religion is to many believers: ‘a total account of life, 
organizing, explaining and justifying all action… generat[ing] elaborate systems of 
belief, institution and ritual applicable to all areas of life’.29 It suggests that religion is 
all very well in its place, but it should not be taken too seriously.  
Buxton LJ’s further argument that the practice must be ‘clear and uniform’ is 
also highly problematic. Within any religion there is likely to be disagreement, 
perhaps extensive, on religious issues and stricter or more lenient interpretation of 
religious doctrine. Far from being a problem, this pluralism in religious belief should, 
broadly speaking, be protected. There is no reason why a guarantee of religious 
freedom should be a protector of religious orthodoxy. Such an approach also requires 
an intensive and potentially intrusive analysis into religious belief and sets the court 
up as a theological authority. Many religious doctrines are not immediately 
perceptible from religious texts. For example, it is not immediately obvious that the 
Biblical injunction to ‘abstain from blood’30 means that Jehovah’s Witnesses are 
forbidden from receiving blood transfusions, but this is nevertheless a sincere 
 
 
28Application No. 49853/99, Admissibility, 2 October 2001. 
29 Cochran Religion in Public and Private Life (London: Routledge, 1990) at 65. 
30 Acts 15:20. 
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religious conviction which, assuming competence to make medical decisions, should 
be respected by courts.   
It is for good reason that the majority of the Court of Appeal and the House of 
Lords rejected Buxton LJ’s approach. It may seem surprising that corporal 
punishment is a protected action, but the parents’ belief that it was part of a 
religiously required way of raising children was sincere and important. The important 
issues about the protection of children can be dealt with under the question of 
justification. 
Some cases though are more complex and require a difficult line to be drawn. 
In Skugar v Russia31 a woman refused to accept a taxpayer identification number 
because she believed it contained a number which ‘was a forerunner of the mark of 
the Antichrist’.32 The court held that, ‘general legislation which applies on a neutral 
basis without any link whatsoever with an applicant's personal beliefs cannot in 
principle be regarded as an interference.’33 The court made reference to US law, and 
in particular to Employment Division v Smith.34 This though is in tension with the 
usual protection of Article 9. Employment Division v Smith held that there was no 
interference with the free exercise right under the First Amendment where there was a 
prohibition on the use of peyote, including for Native American religious ceremonies. 
Smith only permits a very small number of cases, essentially those where there 
appears to be a discriminatory intent, to give rise to any claim.  However, this is not 
the ECtHR’s position. The court has held that forced compliance with generally 
applicable laws where this is contrary to religious beliefs can be a violation of Article 
9.35 Indeed it has held that failing to treat a person differently because of their 
religious beliefs can be a violation of Article 14.36  
While Skugar’s reasoning is therefore unpersuasive, the decision is justifiable. 
Skugar did not have to use the taxpayer number, which was automatically created for 
her, as she could identify herself to the tax authorities using personal information such 
 
 
31 Application No. 40010/04, Admissibility, 3 December 2009. 
32 Ibid.  
33 Ibid. 
34 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
35 e.g. Bayatyan v Armenia (2012) 54 EHRR 15. 
36 Thlimmenos v Greece (2001) 31 EHRR 15. 
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as her name and date of birth. She was trying to challenge an internal matter of the tax 
authorities. Its affect on her was therefore too remote. 
The weakest form of interference with beliefs are what Lupu calls 
‘atmospheric burdens’ or the ‘behavioral trends and patterns in society at large’.37 
These should not be considered enough to give rise to a claim. Living in a society that 
does not generally share your religious beliefs may make living according to religious 
precepts more difficult, but this does not mean that the failure to change society to 
conform to your beliefs constitutes an interference with your rights. Merely being 
aware that people have different views on a matter does not interfere with a right even 
if this causes offence.  
Whilst there are a number of cases which declare that ‘atmospheric burdens’ 
are relevant to the limitation of rights under Article 10, this does not mean that 
religious offence gives rise to a free standing right under Article 9. It is true that in 
Otto-Preminger Institut v Austria38 for example an art-house cinema was prevented 
from showing a film which was undoubtedly potentially offensive to Christians39 on 
the basis that it violated ‘the respect for the religious feelings of believers as 
guaranteed in Article 9’.40 However, although these cases confusingly say that the 
action is justified on the basis of the rights of others, it is clear from Choudhury v 
UK41 that there is no such freestanding right. A Muslim man argued that the High 
Court’s refusal to grant him permission to bring a private prosecution against Salman 
Rushdie for blasphemy in his book The Satanic Verses, failed to protect his rights 
under Article 9. He failed on the basis that there was no right to ‘bring any specific 
form of proceedings against those who… offend the sensitivities of an individual or 
group’.42 This would clearly be a great violation of the right of free expression as well 
as the religious freedom of the writer, who would be coerced into outwardly 
respecting religious views which he did not respect. In reality, Otto-Preminger-
 
 
37 Lupu, supra n 3 
38 (1995) 19 EHRR 34.  See also IA v Turkey (2007) 45 EHRR 30; Handyside v UK (A/24) 
(1979-80), 1 EHRR 737 
39 The film was about a nineteenth century play which ‘portrays God the Father as old, infirm 
and ineffective, Jesus Christ as a "mummy’s boy" of low intelligence and the Virgin Mary, 
who is obviously in charge, as an unprincipled wanton’ Ibid. at para 21. 
40 Ibid. at para 56. 
41 Application No. 17439/90, Admissibility, 5 March 1991. 
42 Ibid. 
 
 
 
13 
Institut seems to have more to do with the doctrine of the margin of appreciation than 
any real acceptance of such a broad positive right. 
Overall, despite some overly restrictive decisions particularly in Commission 
decisions, the Court appears to have reached a sensible general conclusion that there 
is an interference if an act is a manifestation of a sincere religious conviction, 
provided that there is an intimate connection between the act and the belief. This 
provides a workable test which excludes remote burdens but which is broad enough to 
respond to the reality of religious belief and practice. 
 
3. The ‘specific situation’ rule  
 
This fairly positive picture was however greatly marred by the ECtHR’s use of ‘the 
specific situation rule’. This holds that if there is a conflict between a religious 
obligation and another obligation, normally an employment obligation, which can be 
avoided by resignation or similar action, then there is no interference with the right. In 
Pichon and Sajous v France43 therefore the Court held that requiring pharmacists to 
sell contraceptive pills did not interfere with their right to freedom of religion because 
they could avoid this conflict by leaving their employment. Thus their application was 
dismissed as manifestly ill founded. Similarly, in Ahmad v UK44 there was held to be 
no interference where a teacher wished to arrange his timetable so that he could attend 
mosque on Friday lunchtimes, as it was held he could have avoided this conflict by 
resigning or taking up a part-time contract.45  
This principle has been almost universally criticised and for good reason. The 
first problem is in the assumption that employment is truly voluntary. Given that for 
most people employment is an economic necessity, that finding alternative 
employment of any kind, and particularly on the same terms, may be difficult, and 
that there is no guarantee that all workplaces will not prohibit such conduct, choice 
may be very constricted. Furthermore, given that people’s values and religious beliefs 
 
 
43 Supra n 28. 
44 (1982) 4 EHRR 126. 
45 Other cases include Konttinen v Finland Application No. 24949/94, Admissibility, 3 
December 1996; Karaduman v Turkey Application No.16278/90, Admissibility, 3 May 1993; 
Kalaç v Turkey (1997) 27 EHRR 552. 
 
 
 
14 
change over time, the dilemma is not necessarily something which has been actively 
been chosen, but rather simply arisen.  
More fundamentally, it is also questionable whether it really matters that the 
dilemma is in some way caused voluntarily. This emphasis on choice is strangely 
confined only to this issue. In some ways the point of human rights is to protect 
people from harsh consequences arising from their unpopular choices. Furthermore, 
the problem of voluntariness even in employment is not in other contexts taken to be 
an absolute bar. If resignation were always sufficient to protect rights then this would 
make employment a ‘rights-free zone’, which is not true either as a matter of practice 
or principle. In Copland v UK46 for example it was held there was a violation of an 
employee’s Article 8 rights where her internet usage, phone calls and emails were 
monitored at work when there was no law in force which regulated such monitoring. 
The fact that she could resign and avoid such intrusion was not discussed.  
There are also problems of discrimination. If rules, for example, against 
religious clothing are applied to all employment, it may have a discriminatory effect 
‘since it could result in the disappearance of entire communities from visible 
membership of the government workforce without raising any Article 9 issues at 
all.’47 Since it is likely that the religion of the majority is likely to be accommodated 
simply because they have political power or because such arrangements are seen as 
natural and therefore not questioned, it is minorities who are likely to be 
disproportionately affected. This is seen very clearly in French law, which prohibits 
only ‘obtrusive’ religious symbols in state schools48 thus prohibiting the Muslim 
headscarf and the Sikh turban, but not the wearing of small crosses. Similarly 
Christian teachers are very likely to receive Sundays and religious holidays such as 
Easter and Christmas off work without question because this is simply the way the 
school timetable is run. This is not to say that there is anything necessarily wrong 
with this: when some will always be disadvantaged it makes sense to disadvantage the 
 
 
46 (2007) EHRR 37 
47 Edge ‘Religious Rights and Choice under the European Convention on Human Rights’ 
[2000] 3 Web Journal of Current Legal Issues, available at: 
http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/2000/issue3/edge3.html (last accessed 24 April 2013) 
48 Loi n° 2004-228 du 15 mars 2004 encadrant, en application du principe de laïcité, le port de 
signes ou de tenues manifestant une appartenance religieuse dans les écoles, collèges et lycées 
publics 
 
 
 
15 
fewest, and change on such matters which are embedded in cultural consciousness is 
likely to be highly contentious. However, it demonstrates that there is nothing 
necessarily neutral in such standards. 
More broadly, the specific situation rule is unprincipled. It denies the right of 
justification discussed above and ignores the fact that freedom of religion is a basic 
right. That a person can resign is relevant to the balancing test and may be ultimately 
be the choice they are put to, but the specific situation approach prevents even the 
consideration of rights. As Gunn puts it, it means that the ‘”fundamental rights” of the 
European Convention are subject to a simply contractual waiver’.49 If freedom of 
religion is a ‘one of the foundations of a "democratic society"… one of the most vital 
elements that go to make up the identity of believers and their conception of life… 
and a precious asset”50 then surely it should be protected in employment, which is 
after all where a large part of everyday life is spent.51 These claims may involve only 
minor parts of an employee’s duties or minor variation to uniform standards but still 
lead to resignation.  
If this were the only way to achieve results which were intuitively sensible, 
then it could perhaps be supported. However, this is not the case. The court’s 
reasoning in Pichon and Sajous was essentially a balancing process: women were 
entitled to access contraception with ease, the applicants were acting in the public 
sphere and they could manifest their beliefs in other ways. Similarly in Ahmed, it may 
have been justified for the school to refuse permission: it may have been too difficult 
administratively to change his timetable so that he was not teaching on Friday 
lunchtimes. However, all these issues can be discussed in reference to whether 
infringement of the practice was justified, and not to the prior question of whether the 
right was infringed.  
 
A. Reconsideration of the Specific Situation Rule? 
 
 
 
49 Gunn, ‘Adjudicating Rights of Conscience under the European Convention on Human 
Rights’, in Van der Vyver and Witte (eds), ‘Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective: 
Legal Perspectives’ (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1996). 
50 Kokkinakis supra n 1 
51 Although the fact that it is a workplace may be relevant to how these rights can be 
exercised. 
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The ECtHR appears to have recognised some of this criticism. The specific situation 
rule was first implicitly reconsidered in Dahlab v Switzerland,52 a case decided shortly 
before Pichon and Sajous, but by a different Section of the Court. Dahlab was a 
teacher in a state infant school who was told she could not wear the hijab while 
teaching (although she had in fact worn it without problems for a considerable 
period). Although the case was declared inadmissible on the, perhaps rather specious 
grounds, that a ‘powerful religious symbol’ such as a hijab would have a proselytising 
effect on young children and the restriction was therefore proportionate to the aim of 
protecting the rights and freedoms of others, public order and public safety, there was 
no argument that her right was not infringed.  
The reconsideration edged further towards being explicit in Sahin v Turkey.53 
Sahin was a university student who was prohibited from attending university while 
wearing a headscarf. As she felt this was her religious duty, and since she was 
prohibited by law from wearing her headscarf at any university in Turkey, her only 
chance to pursue her hope of a medical degree and comply with her religious belief 
was to study abroad, which she eventually did. However, the Grand Chamber avoided 
addressing the question directly, but adopted the Chamber reasoning that the ‘Court 
proceeds on the assumption that the regulations in issue…constituted an interference 
with the applicant’s right to manifest her religion.’54 This was therefore a rather 
lukewarm reconsideration. However, given the highly politically controversial nature 
of Sahin it might be thought that the Grand Chamber would have taken this 
opportunity to dispose of the case, without ruling on controversial issues about state 
secularism and the dangers of political Islam, if they had agreed with the specific 
situation approach. 
There was subsequently greater, if still implicit reconsideration of the idea at 
the Strasbourg level in cases involving Article 8 rather than 9, as highlighted by 
Leigh.55 Schüth and Obst v Germany56 involved claims by employees who had been 
dismissed by religious organisations because of extra-marital relationships and 
 
 
52 Application No. 42393/98, Merits, 15 January 2001. 
53 (2007) 44 EHRR 105  
54 Ibid. at 120. 
55 Leigh, ‘Balancing Religious Autonomy and Other Human Rights under the European 
Convention’ (2012) 1 Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 109. 
56 (2011) 52 EHRR 32. 
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claimed this was a violation of Article 8. Their claims were not dismissed at the 
interference stage but instead proceeded to the balancing stage, where Schüth’s claim 
was successful. These cases though involve Article 8 and while there appears to be 
little reason in principle why Article 8 should have greater protection than Article 9, 
the specific situation approach could still have been maintained. However, in a case 
heard a few months later, Siebenhaar v Germany,57 there was found to be an 
interference with Article 9 where a nursery assistant was dismissed from her 
employment with the Lutheran Church when it was discovered she was a member of 
the Universal Church, although on the facts no violation was found. A new approach 
was therefore signalled before Eweida v UK was heard. 
 
B. The specific situation rule in domestic law 
 
While the slow process of reconsideration began, such developments were not taking 
place at domestic level. Rather the specific situation rule was firmly entrenched. This 
is obvious from R (Begum) v Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High School.58 
Begum wanted to wear a jilbab to school, described as a ‘long coat-like garment’,59 
but her school only permitted her to wear a shalwar kameeze, which she considered 
not modest enough to comply with her religious obligations. The majority of the 
House of Lords held that there was no interference with her right because she chose to 
attend the school and there were other schools in the area which would permit her to 
wear it. The reasoning is unsatisfactory. Firstly, Begum was not in an analogous 
situation with employment because she was legally required to attend school and it 
was originally her parent’s choice and not hers which secondary school she attended. 
As it happens, the school appears to have put a great deal of effort into ensuring that 
the uniform complied with the religious precepts of most of its students and to have 
refused further changes to the uniform on the basis that it would lead to peer pressure 
to comply with stricter standards of dress. However, this is strictly irrelevant. As the 
argument is that the existence of other schools and her choice in attending a school 
with a uniform code is sufficient, the school was under no obligation to even consider 
 
 
57 Application No 18136/02 (3 February 2011). It is referred to by Leigh supra n 55.  
58 [2006] UKHL 15, [2007] 1 AC 100. 
59 Ibid. at 109. 
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her demands, or to provide any alternative to the standard school uniform at all. The 
upheaval that would be caused by moving schools is immediately discounted. Of 
course, this may well have been the best result but compromise can only be decided in 
the context of justification. It also created a very different approach in domestic law 
between religious discrimination and race discrimination, meaning that religious 
groups who could also be considered racial groups received greater protection.60 
This very limited approach to religious freedom was evident in the four cases 
which led to the application to Strasbourg in Eweida v UK. In Ladele v Islington 
LBC,61 a registrar refused to perform civil partnerships because she believed that they 
were ‘contrary to God’s instructions’. 62  In McFarlane v Relate (Avon) Ltd, 63  a 
counsellor for Relate refused to provide psycho-sexual counselling to gay couples 
because he felt this would require him to condone their sexual behaviour. In Chaplin v 
Royal Devon and Exeter Hospital NHS Foundation Trust64 a nurse was told she could 
not wear a cross on a chain around her neck, although she was permitted to clip it 
onto her badge or lanyard. In Eweida v British Airways Plc65 a member of BA’s 
check-in staff also wanted to wear a cross visibly. In the first three cases they were all 
dismissed.66 In Eweida’s case, after she refused alternative employment within the 
company in a non-customer facing role, BA, after considerable public outcry, 
changed the rules to permit employees to wear a cross and she returned to work.  
In all four cases, it was held that there was no interference with their rights 
under Article 9. In Ladele, the Court of Appeal quoted Pichon and Sajous 67 
approvingly. The question of violation was addressed together with interference and 
Sahin was used, not to signal a broader approach in considering interference, but in 
demonstrating the limited nature of Article 9 generally. The approach had been even 
more limited in the Employment Appeal Tribunal which had held that the protection 
 
 
60  Compare R. (Watkins-Singh) v Aberdare Girls’ High School Governors [2008] 1865 
(admin), [2008] 3 FCR 203 with R. (Playfoot) v Millais School Governing Body [2007] 
EWHC 1698 (Admin), [2007] HRLR 34.  
61 [2009] EWCA Civ 1357, [2010] 1 WLR 955. 
62 Ibid. at 959. 
63 [2010] EWCA Civ 880, [2010] IRLR 872. 
64 [2010] ET 1702886/2009. 
65 [2010] EWCA Civ 80, [2010] ICR 890. 
66 Chaplin was initially transferred to a different job, but when this position ended was 
dismissed. 
67 Supra n 28. 
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for Article 9 rights was ‘very narrow protection indeed.’68 McFarlane followed 
similar reasoning. In Eweida it was held that ‘the jurisprudence on Article. 9 does 
nothing to advance the claimant's case’69 and quoted Begum in finding that: 
 
The Strasbourg institutions have not been at all ready to find an 
interference with the right to manifest religious belief in practice or 
observance where a person has voluntarily accepted an employment or 
role which does not accommodate that practice or observance and there 
are other means open to the person to practise or observe his or her 
religion without undue hardship or inconvenience.70 
 
Article 9 has therefore not been of much practical use as far as the British 
courts were concerned, at least in employment or similar cases. This had been the 
subject of judicial criticism, most notably in Copsey v WWB Devon Clays Ltd,71 but 
given that it had been approved by the House of Lords in Begum and that it showed 
no signs of wanting to reconsider it (the Supreme Court having denied permission to 
appeal in Ladele and Eweida) this undeniably represented the law.  
This is not to say though that the specific situation rule excluded all claims. In 
R (National Secular Society) v Bideford Town Council72 a councillor claimed it 
violated his Article 9 rights when the council said prayers at the beginning of council 
meetings. The court declined to hold that because he had stood for election knowing 
that prayers were said, he should be taken to have accepted this.73 The reasoning is 
clearly right. An elected office is not the same as other employment, because as the 
court held, there is a fundamental right of voters to choose who they wish to represent 
them. Alternative ‘employment’ 74  probably does not exist and is in any case 
irrelevant. In the earlier case of Williamson,75 discussed above, it was held that the 
 
 
68 [2009] ICR 387 at 413. 
69 Supra n 65 at 888. 
70 Ibid. at 888-9. 
71 [2005] EWCA Civ 932 [2005] ICR 1789. 
72 [2012] EWHC 175 (Admin); [2012] 2 All E.R. 1175. 
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alternative must be practical and not merely theoretical. The Court of Appeal had held 
that the parents could have either educated their children at home, or could have 
attended school or waited until their children were home from school to discipline 
them. The House of Lords rejected these arguments as impractical. Nevertheless, the 
success of the argument up to this point demonstrates the narrowness of the Article 9 
right in English law. 
 
4. The consequences of Eweida v UK 
 
The combination of the beginning of reassessment of the specific situation rule and 
the restrictive approach of the UK courts laid the ground for a reconsideration of 
Article 9(1) in Eweida v UK. In all four cases it was held there had been an 
interference with the applicant’s rights under Article 9, or in Ladele (since there was 
no claim under Article 9 alone, but only Article 9 and 14) that the acts were within the 
ambit of Article 9. In fairly short reasoning, the ECHR made clear two important 
points. The first was that, while there must be a ‘sufficiently close and direct nexus 
between the act and the underlying belief,’76 there was no need for the practice to be 
religiously mandated. Protection was not limited to an ‘act of worship or devotion 
which forms part of the practice of a religion or belief in a generally recognised 
form’77 and thus a prohibition on wearing a cross could potentially be an interference. 
Secondly, the court disclaimed the specific situation rule, holding that it would be 
better to weigh the possibility of leaving employment at the balancing stage. Even 
McFarlane, who only objected to providing sexual, and not relationship, counselling 
to same sex couples, was not considered to have waived his rights by voluntarily 
enrolling on Relate’s psycho-sexual counselling programme. Eweida v UK therefore 
is an important decision. It gives the right in principle to manifest religious beliefs in 
employment and puts the focus on the question of justification, thus meaning that 
Article 9 claims should be taken seriously. However, as would be expected, questions 
still remain about the scope of Article 9(1) and it is to these that the article now turns. 
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A. Remaining Questions 
 
The first question relates to the residual role of choice and consent. Eweida v UK 
clearly and correctly states that a person cannot be taken to have given up their rights 
merely because they have accepted particular employment. However, there must be 
some cases where claims can be ruled out without pushing organisations ‘into the 
defensive stances of having to show justification for interference’78 because a person 
has unequivocally accepted the interference. Denying the idea of choice has any 
relevance is also infantilising to the person claiming the right. For these reasons, in 
some truly voluntary situations there can be no interference with freedom of religion. 
For example, if a person joins a university Christian union, they cannot then complain 
that the society does not respect their atheist views as it holds prayers before each 
meeting. The free choice to join and leave the society adequately protects freedom of 
religion.  
Even in some employment situations, there may be no interference in some 
circumstances. If a person willingly accepts a job when they are aware its intrinsic 
nature will be in conflict with their religious beliefs, it is difficult to see why they 
should be relieved of the consequences of their choice when the conflict is both 
obvious and avoidable. If for example the job is to perform abortions in an abortion 
clinic, a doctor cannot accept it and subsequently claim that performing abortions is 
an interference with her Catholic beliefs. This should be a very limited exception 
though and should apply in very few situations. It would not apply where a 
gynaecologist, although initially employed to perform abortions at a hospital, had a 
religious conversion and no longer wished to perform them, but would perform other 
medical procedures that the hospital performed, because the role of gynaecologist is 
not intrinsically in conflict with religious obligations. Again, it should be stressed that 
this does not necessarily mean such accommodation should be given: it will depend 
on the rights and interests of others. 
This exception is potentially not only relevant to practical considerations, but 
also to an explicit and intrinsic workplace ethos. However, even greater care should 
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be taken in holding that there is no interference in these situations. It should not be 
held that because, for example, McFarlane knew that Relate had as one of its aims a 
commitment to non-discrimination, there was no interference with his rights where he 
sought to discriminate. Similarly, Islington’s ‘Dignity for All’ policy, which Islington 
held precluded Ladele’s claim, was a commendable attempt to avoid discrimination 
and increase inclusion, but that does not mean it could require all employees to accept 
the ‘thick’ version of tolerance that lay underneath it. The particular views of its 
employees were not relevant to its activities or to the purpose of the organisation. 
However, there could be an argument that a Green Party councillor who voted against 
a motion in favour of same-sex marriage and was then expelled from the party, 
because this went against party policy, was not subject to any interference with her 
belief.79 Her role was intrinsically bound up with her beliefs. The right to express 
beliefs and remain within a political party can only be a limited one, as otherwise the 
distinctiveness and usefulness of political parties would be undermined. 
So far the discussion has only focused on secular workplaces, but the question 
also arises as to whether there are individual rights to freedom of religion within 
religious organisations. It is clear from Schüth and Obst80 and Siebenhaar81 that 
Article 8 rights exist within religious employment and also that, where a person is of a 
different religion, they can claim Article 9 rights if they are dismissed for this reason. 
It is also fairly clear that there can be an interference with the Article 9 or 10 rights of 
some employees if they are dismissed because they criticise particular doctrines of a 
religion.82 However, can Article 9 be used for greater internal challenges to religious 
doctrine? For example, a woman might claim that she believes it is her religious 
vocation to become a priest in the Catholic Church, and that, properly understood, 
Catholicism requires female priests and that the bar on women priests prevents her 
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from living out her beliefs.83 Evidently, there is sufficient justification for holding that 
this is not a violation, in terms of the collective religious freedom of the church and 
the religious freedom of those who are opposed to any change in policy, but is there 
an interference? Of course, in order to be caught by the ECHR there would have to be 
some state action, but this could be found in the fact that the state has not outlawed 
sex discrimination for certain religious posts, in contrast to most employment. So far 
the ECHR has rejected these types of arguments. Thus in Karlsson v Sweden84 where 
a priest was refused a post in the state church because of doubts over his ability to 
work properly with female priests the Court held there was no interference. He had to 
accept the policy of his church.  
Such an approach is not inconsistent with the broader approach taken to 
interference in secular employment. Religious freedom is inherently limited when a 
person becomes a religious minister.  A person has a right to try and change the 
practices and doctrines of a religion85 but there can be no right to ensure that that they 
are in conformity. A church must be able to choose its own doctrines. 
 
B. Substantive Limits? 
 
The discussion of Eweida and Article 9(1) has so far has been about in what 
circumstances religious beliefs are protected, rather than on limits on protected beliefs 
per se. Eweida also raises, although does not conclude, a second issue. This is about 
the substantive limits on the views that have protection under Article 9 and in 
particular what protection discriminatory beliefs receive. In the domestic courts in 
Ladele v Islington LBC, 86 the Employment Appeal Tribunal held that if Ladele were 
given an exemption for refusing to perform civil partnerships this may breach Article 
17 of the ECHR. The National Secular Society also made this point in its submission 
as intervener to the ECtHR. 
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Article 17 prevents ‘any State, group or person’ using the rights in the 
Convention to aim to destroy Convention rights and freedoms or ‘their limitation to a 
greater extent than is provided for in this Convention’. The importance of preventing 
democracy being destroyed from within was readily ascertainable in the post-Second 
World War era and the idea still has significant importance, even if the line is difficult 
to draw in practice. On this basis it has been held that Article 10 does not to apply to 
Nazi doctrines,87 since Nazism seeks to destroy the basis of democracy, or to violent 
speech,88 because such violence is antithetical to the nature of democracy and a call 
for violence is to deliberately call to violate the rights of others. 
However, not all discriminatory views fall outside the ambit of Convention 
protection. In Redfearn v UK,89 a bus driver, responsible mainly for driving disabled 
or elderly people, was dismissed because he stood for election as a British National 
Party (BNP) councillor. At the relevant time, the BNP’s constitution held that the 
party stood, ‘for the preservation of the national and ethnic character of the British 
people and is wholly opposed to any form of racial integration between British and 
non-European peoples. It is therefore committed to stemming and reversing the tide of 
non-white immigration’.90 The ECtHR held that the fact he had no real opportunity to 
challenge this dismissal because of his political beliefs was a violation of Article 11. 
The Court denied that its role was ‘to pass judgment on the policies or aims, 
obnoxious or otherwise, of the BNP at the relevant time’91 and held that his right of 
freedom of association was protected by the Convention.  
Article 17 is an inappropriate concept for the situation that arose in Ladele. It 
should be used only in very limited circumstances where the right sought is contrary 
to the nature of democracy or seeks to entirely deny the dignity of others. Ladele’s 
views were undoubtedly offensive to many, including some of her colleagues. 
However, holding that her claim was beyond the pale of acceptable action and 
entirely unprotected would be unwarranted. Ladele did not seek to deny anyone the 
right to enter into a civil partnership, she merely refused to take part in their 
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formation. The letter she wrote asking for an exemption was described as ‘thoughtful 
and temperate’.92 Furthermore, as Elias J stated, ‘fundamental changes in social 
attitudes, particularly with respect to sexual orientation, are happening very fast and 
for some— and not only those with religious objections— they are genuinely 
perplexing.’93 While this is in itself perhaps not a principled reason for differential 
treatment, it demonstrates that some caution should be exercised. Indeed the ECtHR 
itself is slightly ambivalent on the issue. While discrimination on the grounds of 
sexual orientation requires ‘very weighty reasons’,94 it is not a violation of the 
Convention for the state to discriminate in not providing same-sex marriage95 or 
presumably (although this has not been tested) any kind of legal relationship 
recognition for same-sex couples.  
Although Ladele’s actions were discriminatory, and potentially offensive, they 
cannot really be equated with the threat of undermining democracy at issue in Refah 
Partisi v Turkey96 or the Holocaust denial in Garaudy v France.97 Of course, the rights 
of others, both those who sought civil partnerships at Islington, and the wider public 
interest in non-discrimination, is relevant to the discussion, but this can be dealt with 
in the analysis of justification. The Court did not address the question of Article 17 in 
its judgment. However, it must have implicitly rejected such an argument since it 
found that there was an interference with Ladele’s rights, although this was justified.  
Further substantive restrictions have also been applied in some domestic cases 
which go beyond the requirements in Article 17. They were set out in Campbell and 
Cosans v United Kingdom98 and require that the beliefs: 
 
a) Attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance  
b) Are worthy of respect in a ‘democratic society’ and are not incompatible with 
human dignity 
c) Relate to a weighty and substantial aspect of human life and behaviour99 
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These criteria though originated in a claim involving the right of parents to 
ensure their children’s education was in conformity with their religious and 
philosophical convictions under Protocol 1 Article 2, rather than an Article 9 case. 
Although these criteria certainly apply in English law,100 it is unclear whether the 
ECtHR also considers that they apply in this context. McColgan argues that they 
never applied to Article 9 claims and they were misapplied by the British courts.101 
Certainly there is no mention of it in Eweida v UK.  
It is questionable whether there is need for the Cosans criteria to apply to 
religious beliefs under Article 9 beyond some minimal level of ‘cogency, seriousness, 
cohesion and importance’,102 as was stated in Eweida v UK. Even coherence is a 
slippery concept. Given that many religious beliefs are hardly easy to understand and 
may rest on faith and allegory, it may be very difficult for those who are not members 
of a faith to understand it or to see how a religious text leads to the religious claim at 
issue. Care should therefore be taken that this does not become a test of religious 
orthodoxy or the restrictive view of religious practices argued for by Buxton LJ. 
The criterion of ‘worthy of respect in a democratic society’ and not 
incompatible with human dignity’ is more problematic. It is not that some substantive 
requirement is inappropriate: a religion which required the torture of children should 
not receive protection, but that placing a constitutive restriction on Article 9 is 
potentially open to abuse. Excluding the manifestation of beliefs because of the nature 
of the belief should only be a rare occurrence. As was said in Williamson, ‘in matters 
of human rights the court should not show liberal tolerance only to tolerant 
liberals’.103 There should be no restriction greater than that is applied under Article 17 
to all rights. Otherwise this puts Article 9 at greater scrutiny than other rights, and 
invites illegitimate judgment of religious beliefs. New or unfamiliar religious beliefs 
can appear threatening even though, with hindsight, the threat they pose to social 
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order is minimal.104 Regrettably, state-approved discrimination against some religious 
minorities is still a great problem in some Member States, with action often being 
taken on the basis that their actions will undermine established religious traditions.105 
Particular vigilance should therefore be taken in making sure that Article 9 is not 
overly restricted. 
The arguments made in this section have not been fully worked out but rather 
aim to demonstrate that the welcome rejection of the specific situation rule opens up 
more difficult questions about the extent and role of Article 9. These issues will need 
to be addressed by the Court in the future. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
As has been demonstrated, the question of when an interference should be found is a 
complex one. Like so many other issues, this area raises the difficult question of how 
different interests can be protected: here the balance between the interest in broad 
protection for religious beliefs and practices, with the interest in making sure 
decision-making does not become impossible because of the requirement to take into 
account numerous and opposing religious beliefs. Eweida v UK deals with some these 
complexities and is a welcome extension and clarification of the extent of Article 9. 
Its most important aspect is its rejection of the specific situation rule. It seems to give 
a broad understanding of religious rights and to accept their importance both in and 
outside employment. It is a welcome step forward in the ‘growing-up’ process of 
Article 9 which appears now to have real relevance. The hypothetical plea Lewis 
imagines a potential claimant making of, ‘Why do you tell us we have these freedoms 
when you are so obviously not prepared to protect them?’ may no longer be so 
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penetrating,106 What is certain though is that there is more important litigation to 
follow. As Mummery LJ stated in Copsey v WWB Devon Clays Ltd: 
 
It is probably only a matter of time, however, before the fundamental and 
pervasive character of Article 9 will be more fully revealed. If the Article 
means what it says, it has the potential to be far reaching in its legal, 
social, economic and political effects.107 
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